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In 1960, Congress had not passed a single act dealing specifically
with juvenile delinquency prevention. Twenty years later, seven cabi-
net-level departments and two federal agencies provided direct financial
assistance to forty-five juvenile delinquency-related programs.2 Indeed,
by the early 1980's, federal grants-in-aid had become such an integral
part of the nation's youth services apparatus that a Department of Jus-
tice report concluded that government withdrawal would jeopardize the
* The research for notes 1-44 and accompanying text was supported in part by Grant No.
79-JN-AX-0013/77NI-99-0009, awarded to the American Justice Institute by the National
Institute of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention of the Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention of the United States Department of Justice. Points of view or opin-
ions stated are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position on
policies of the United States Department of Justice, the American Justice Institute, or the
Center for the Assessment of the Juvenile Justice System.
** B.A., University of California at Santa Barbara, 1970; M.A., University of California at
Santa Barbara, 1978; Ph.D., University of California at Santa Barbara, 1981. The author is
Associate Criminal Justice Specialist at the American Justice Institute in Sacramento, Cali-
fornia and a part-time instructor in the Criminal Justice Department of California State
University in Sacramento.
I Prior to the Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act of 1961, 18 U.S.C.
§ 5031 (1976), two other federal acts dealing with the juvenile justice system but not address-
ing prevention were passed-the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938, 18 U.S.C. § 921
(1940), and the Federal Youth Corrections Act of 1950, 18 U.S.C. § 5005 (1976).
2 The seven federal departments administering delinquency prevention-related grants in
1980 were Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services (formerly Health, Education,
and Welfare), Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Justice, and Labor. The two fed-
eral agencies were the Community Services Administration and ACTION. See OFFICE OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FIFTH ANALYSIS
AND EVALUATION OF FEDERAL DELINQUENCY PROGRAMS (1980).
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existence of most subsidized programs.3 Such withdrawal is currently
under consideration by an Administration frustrated and angry with the
insignificant decreases in juvenile delinquency achieved despite the gen-
erous expenditures allocated over the past two decades for federal
programs.
The historical factors stimulating federal commitment to delin-
quency prevention, as well as those contributing to current demands for
federal withdrawal, are the primary concern of this Article. By utilizing
historical methodology, Part II traces federal involvement in juvenile
justice issues through four evolutionaryperiods:
1. from colonial times to 1908, the federal government left juvenile delin-
quency problems to philanthropic charities, states, and localities;
2. from 1909 to 1932, the federal government began assisting child serv-
ing professionals, sponsoring national youth-related conferences, and col-
lecting and disseminating national research data on youth;
3. from 1933 to 1960, federal legislators reacted to youth and family
needs with short-term policies and discussion forums for improving condi-
tions affecting youths' lives;
4. from 1961 to 1980, Congress enacted a series of federal mandates to
reform and augment the juvenile justice system, provide community pre-
vention and diversion programs, and create rehabilitative alternatives to
institutionalization.
Secondarily, this Article explores public dissatisfaction with preven-
tion program results. Part III examines recent efforts to translate pre-
vention theory into practice. While recognizing past failures of
individual delinquency prevention treatment programs, this Article rec-
ommends federal support for promising new prevention programs
designed to modify family, school, and peer group policies and practices
negatively affecting youth. It further suggests that the federal govern-
ment's involvement in proactive prevention theories and programs has
had insufficient time to evolve, undergo long-term evaluations, or
counteract centuries of public and private punitive and rehabilitative
reactions to delinquent behavior.
Such an assertion necessitates an understanding of what does and
does not constitute prevention. Unfortunately, a consensual definition
accepted by policymakers, practitioners, and theorists has never materi-
alized. The debate centers around two questions: who should be pre-
vented from committing what types of behavior, and when should
prevention occur-before or after misbehavior? Without consensual
answers to these questions, any prevention analysis must caution the
reader about judgmental selection. Due to this Article's focus on federal
involvement in delinquency prevention, this author chose the definition
3 G. JOHNSON, T. BIRD, J. LIrTLE & S. BEVILLE, DELINQUENCY PREVENTION: THEO-
RIES AND STRATEGIES 1 (1979).
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most often adopted by the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Juve-
nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention:
Delinquency prevention . ..refers to activities deszgned (as distinct from
intended or hoped) to reduce the incidence of delinquent acts (as distinct
from arrests), and directed to youth who are not being dealt with as a
result of contact with the juvenile justice system (thus excluding activities
that are very clearly reactions to trouble).
4
Thus, prevention efforts discussed herein include activities designed
to reduce delinquent actions before official contact with the juvenile jus-
tice system. Hence, prevention theories and programs must not be con-
fused with rehabilitation theories and programs occurring after
entanglement with the system. While neither theory currently enjoys
widespread popularity, few persons recognize the very real differences
between prevention and rehabilitation: "Rehabilitation is the result of
any planned intervention that reduces an offender's further criminal ac-
tivity, whether that reduction is mediated by personality, behavior, abil-
ities, attitudes, values, or other factors." 5 Prevention programs are
proactive efforts to reduce delinquent acts prior to their commission.
Since rehabilitation programs are reactive delinquency reduction endeav-
ors conducted after initial misbehavior, they are beyond the scope of this
study.
6
4 G. JOHNSON, T. BIRD, J. W. LITTLE & S. BEVILLE, supra note 3, at s-1 (emphasis
added).
5 L. SECHREST, S. WHITE, & E. BROWN, THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFEND-
ERS: PROBLEMS & PROSPECTS 4-5 (1979).
6 Currently, policymakers and practitioners are engaged in a heated debate about reha-
bilitation's efficacy. Building upon the promises of rehabilitation as espoused in 1959, reform-
ers hoped to change criminal offenders' behavior, making them productive members of
society. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values, and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L. CRIMI-
NOLOGY & POLICE Scl. 226 (1959). Shortly thereafter, many studies examined rehabilitation
programs and found disappointing results. Three recent studies concluded that both institu-
tionalized and non-institutionalized rehabilitation efforts did not appreciably alter recidivism
patterns. See D. GREENBERG, CORRECTIONS & PUNISHMENT (1977); D. LIPTON, R. MAR-
TINSON & J. WILKs, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF
TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975); Bailey, Correctional Outcome: An Evaluation of 100
Reports, 57 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 153 (1966).
In 1977 the Panel on Research and Rehabilitation Techniques was established under the
aegis of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) Committee on Research
"to determine whether the available research warranted the conclusion that criminal offend-
ers could be successfully rehabilitated" and "to suggest as specifically as possible directions for
both program development and research." S. MARTIN, L. SECHREST & R. REDNER, NEW
DIRECTIONS IN THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS vii, viii (1981). While its
two resulting studies, published in 1979 and 1981, determined past evaluations were "reason-
ably accurate," they did not reach the same pessimistic conclusion. Instead, the panel found
"[t]hat existing studies cannot yield useful knowledge about the effects of correctional rehabili-
tation." Id at 9 (emphasis added). The panel's final report stated:
[T]he scientific approach we recommend requires the commitment of substantial sums of
money to the acquisition of knowledge and demands patience from policy makers who
must make decisions regarding the crime problem in the interim. Nevertheless, the panel
[Vol. 74
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The ensuing analysis uncovers a pattern of incremental federal
commitment to juvenile justice programs and issues in general, and a
very recent commitment to prevention programs, as defined herein, in
particular. While delinquency was a societal problem characteristic of
each historical period, policymakers and practitioners responded with
reactive punitive and rehabilitation treatments for over 350 years. It
was not until the 1960's that proactive prevention programs gained
widespread credence and large-scale federal support.
Less than twenty years later, however, prevention theories had
fallen from the public's grace. While suggesting decreased federal com-
mitment of resources, many citizens and policymakers concurrently de-
manded that states revise their statutes to include punitive treatment for
juvenile offenders. 7 By the 1980's, the federal role had come full circle,
moving from no involvement in juvenile justice, to incremental assist-
ance, to massive federal subsidization of prevention efforts, and finally
to a proposed de-escalation of federal support.
believes that a sustained research effort offers the best hope in the long run for the devel-
opment of an effective crime control policy. Better research does not assure more success-
ful programs, but more programs without such a sustained research effort are likely to
lead to continuation of our uncoordinated and noncumulative crime control policies,
which have been dictated principally by social fads and political expediency. Without
such research, past failures are more likely to be repeated and occasionally successful
programs are unlikely to be capitalized on because the factors that account for failure
and success are insufficiently understood.
Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
7 Suggestions for statutory revisions have focused increasingly on waiver provisions for
removing more serious juvenile offenders from the juvenile justice system and treating them
as adults. Efforts to try such offenders in adult courts have taken three legislative avenues
over the last decade. First, state legislatures may mandate that a particular class of offenders
must be tried as adults: Delaware requires that juveniles accused of murder be heard in the
criminal courts, DEL. LAWS tit. 10 § 938 (1982 Supp.); Connecticut requires the transfer to
criminal court of any youth 14 or over who commits murder or who is a recidivist Class A or
B felony offender, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-126 (West 1983 Supp.); and Nevada auto-
matically transfers to adult court youths 16 years or over who commit murder or attempted
murder. NEv. REV. STAT. § 62.080 (1979).
Second, state legislatures may delegate such decision-making authority to the prosecutor,
grand jury, or criminal court: Nebraska delegates such descretion to the prosecutor, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 43-202.01 (1978); Minnesota requires the prosecutor to provide "clear and
convincing evidence" that juvenile court jurisdiction should be waived, MINN. STAT.
§ 260.125(2)(d) (1980); and Michigan provides that a youth over 15 years of age accused of
any felony, may be tried as an adult, MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (598.4) (1976).
Third, state legislatures may designate restrictive custody proceedings: Georgia's Desig-
nated Felony Act, applicable to youths 13 years or older who have committed one of 10
designated violent acts, does not allow the youth to be discharged from the Division of
Youth Services without a court-granted motion made after at least three years of custody. A
final example is New York's recent statute combining mandatory waiver and sentencing ap-
proaches: the 1976 Designated Felony Act requires minimum periods of secure placement for
adjudicated juveniles. N.Y. JUD. LAw § 753(a) (McKinney 1983). For an excellent article
discussing these options and providing an in-depth case study of Minnesota's waiver provi-
sions, see Feld,Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious Young Ofender: Dismantling the
Rehabilititative Ideal, 65 MINN. L. REV. 167 (1981).
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While it is not the intention of this Article to assert that prevention
programs are the panacea to juvenile delinquency problems, it does cau-
tion against premature abandonment of the prevention theory and
method. Proactive prevention programs began receiving federal assist-
ance just twenty years ago. These recent efforts have been charged with
creating, organizing, and dispensing new proactive theories and strate-
gies that contradict traditional reactive approaches used for over three
centuries. Policymakers, armed with a clear understanding of historical
federal involvement with delinquency prevention, may be in a better
position to evaluate the successes and failures of such efforts, and to de-
termine future federal involvement in prevention.
II. HISTORICAL PERIODS OF FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION
Although the federal government was not directly involved in de-
linquency prevention programs until the 1960's, nineteenth century
policymakers gradually expressed interest in and assumed some respon-
sibility for general juvenile justice issues. Initial public efforts, however,
began at the local and state levels. Not until the twentieth century did
the federal government move into the juvenile justice arena.
A. COLONIAL TIMES TO 1908
While colonists did not deny the existence of youthful misconduct,
they made no efforts to prevent such behavior. Since children were con-
sidered evil by nature, it was believed that punishment should be wisely
administered by family members, thereby eliminating the need for
widespread, legally-defined sanctions."
The strains of nineteenth century urbanization contributed to the
gradual breakdown of the American family, the colonial era's mainstay
of individual and collective control.9 Consequently, external public and
private authorities assumed most coercive and punitive responsibilities.
Responding to the challenge was a group of Jacksonian Era philanthro-
8 Seegenerally P. ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD (1962); R. BREMNER, 1 CHILDREN &
YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1970); A. CALHOUN, A SOCIAL HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1917); P. GREVEN,
THE PROTESTANT TEMPERAMENT: PATTERNS OF CHILD-REARING, RELIGIOUS EXPERI-
ENCE, AND THE SELF IN EARLY AMERICA (1977); E. POWERS, CRIME & PUNISHMENT IN
EARLY MASSACHUSETrs (1966); W. SANDERS, JUVENILE OFFENDERS FOR A THOUSAND
YEARS (1970); Illick, Childrearing in Seventeenth Centuy England andAmerica, in THE HISTORY OF
CHILDHOOD 303 (L. DeMause ed. 1974); Teitlebaum & Harris, Some Historical Perspectives on
Governmental Regulation of Children and Parents, in L. TEITLEBAUM & A. COUGH, BEYOND CON-
TROL: STATUS OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT (1977); Walzer, A Period of Ambivalence:
Eighteenth Century American Childhood, in THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD, supra, at 351.
9 See generally E. SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY (1977).
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pists who organized New York's Society for the Reformation of Juvenile
Delinquents in 1823.10 Believing delinquency to be an outgrowth of
poverty and immorality, members of the nation's first philanthropic de-
linquency reform organization lobbied the New York state legislature
for a new, publicly sponsored treatment method-the House of Refuge.
Opening its doors to New York City youth in 1825, Refuge sponsors
claimed a revolutionary new approach to help troubled youth. By insti-
tutionalizing misbehaving children, reformers hoped to save misbe-
having youth within custodial boundaries. Despite such expectations,
Refuge founders built the system upon paternalistic, middle class philo-
sophical foundations that encouraged punishing children who deviated
from societal standards.I While institutionalization was a new systemic
response, its punitive, reactive ideology was borrowed from the colonists.
Although post-Civil War reformers did not abandon institutional-
ization, they revised punitive Jacksonian goals. Custodial facilities be-
came optimistic vehicles for saving, rather than punishing, offenders.
Held in 1870, the nation's first Prison Congress furthered the rehabilita-
tion ideal in its "Declaration of Principles," claiming that individual
offenders could be rehabilitated through educational and industrial
training; that any punishment should be administered according to of-
fender needs rather than the seriousness of the offense; and that indeter-
minate sentencing should be applied to give prisoners incentive to
participate in their own rehabilitation.'
2
10 A number of books and articles have been written about nineteenth and early twenti-
eth century reformers and their youth-serving goals. See general' J. HAwES, CHILDREN IN
URBAN SOCIETY: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1971); J.
KETT, RITES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA, 1780 TO THE PRESENT (1977); R.
PICKETT, HOUSE OF REFUGE: ORIGINS OF JUVENILE REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE, 18 15-
1857 (1969); A. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS (1969); D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE
ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971); E. RYERSON, THE
BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT (1978); S. SCHLOSSMAN,
LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF "PROGRESSIVE"
JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1825-1920 (1977); Kett, Adolescence and Youth in 19th Centugy America, in
THE FAMILY IN HISTORY: INTERDISCIPLINARY ESSAYS 95 (1971); Rothman, The Progressive
Legag: Development of American Altitudes Toward Juvenile Dc/inqueng, in JUVENILE JUSTICE:
THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND CURRENT REFORMS 34 (L. Empey ed. 1979).
11 Recent scholarly literature has been very critical of the House of Refuge movement.
Historian Robert Pickett indicates that little, if any, reform or prevention was accomplished
because pious and elitist reformers failed to comprehend the backgrounds of those they
served. R. PICKET, supra note 10, at 8. Attorney Sanford J. Fox describes the Refuge as a
simple reflection of old, status quo middle-class values disguised in a new format. Fox, Juve-
nilejustice Reform, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970). David Rothman portrays the Refuge as a
revolutionary idea for institutionalized treatment that failed to achieve reform goals because
it evolved into a punitive, custodial facility. Rothman, supra note 10. Steven Schlossman
claims that the Refuge was simply a part of an evolutionary process of middle-class efforts to
deal with lower class youth and was more a prison than a reformatory. S. SCHLOSSMAN,
supra note 10.
12 C. HENDERSON, PRISON REFORM & CRIMINAL LAW (1910).
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In short, Houses of Refuge and similar institutions assured reactive
rather than proactive juvenile rehabilitation policies; responding to of-
fending behavior rather than preventing initial misbehavior character-
ized rehabilitative philosophies.13 Such efforts expanded state and local
involvement in three ways: municipal and state governments became
stronger participants in creating, financing, and administering reform
schools by the beginning of the 1860's; state boards were organized to
inspect, report on, and recommend improvement for almshouses, asy-
lums, and reform schools, beginning with Massachussetts in 1863; and
some states formulated probation systems, again following Massachu-
setts' lead in 1869.14
As the century drew to a close, the public sector's role in the lives of
misbehaving youth had broadened. On July 1, 1899, public interven-
tion entered a new era when the Illinois Juvenile Court was estab-
lished.' 5 The features of this first formalized and separate judicial
process for children were designed to protect the state's right to use
parens patriae for official intervention in their clients' lives:' 6 delinquent
petitions instead of criminal charges would be filed; court proceedings
were to be civil rather than criminal; non-adversarial conditions en-
couraged the court to act in both the child's and the state's best interest;
13 For discussions of nineteenth century juvenile institutional goals, see R. PICKETT, supra
note 11, at chapter four; see also D. STREET, R.D. VINTER & C. PERROW, ORGANIZATIONS
FOR TREATMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS FOR DELINQUENTS (1966); 0.
LEWIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONS AND PRISON CUSTOMS, 1776-1845
(1922).
14 See R. MENNEL, THORNS AND THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1825-1940 65-68 (1973); COMMITTEE ON THE HISTORY OF CHILD-SAVING WORK,
HISTORY OF CHILD-SAVING IN THE UNITED STATES (National Conference of Charities and
Corrections, 1893).
15 Before the establishment of the Illinois Juvenile Court in 1899, there had been several
prior actions for legal involvement undertaken in other states. In 1869 Massachusetts passed
a probation act. See supra text accompanying notes 9-14. In the next decade, Massachusetts
adopted in principle the notion of separate trials for juveniles. The Cincinnati Prison Con-
gress of 1870 adopted a formal "Declaration of Principles" which stressed separate and spe-
cialized treatment for juveniles. Then, in 1892, New York added a new section to its penal
code allowing for separate trials, dockets and records for cases involving juveniles under 16
years-of-age.
16 Parenspatriae originally allowed British courts to protect children with property hold-
ings. Adaptation to American statutes gave local courts the authority over children consid-
ered to be neglected as well as misbehaved. The principle was incorporated into American
juvenile law with the Ex Parle Crouse decision of the Philadelphia Courts in 1838. 4 Whart. 9
(1838). Young Mary Ann Crouse had been committed to the Philadelphia House of Refuge
by her mother without her father's consent. When the father became aware of Mary Ann's
dilemma, she was already incarcerated. He then filed suit on the basis that his daughter was
entitled to a jury trial. The court's decision was unanimous: children did not have access to
the Bill of Rights; thus Mary Ann would remain imprisoned until she was 21. 4 Whart. at 10.
The court's decision was monumental because it held that in some cases the court was better
fit to decide a child's welfare than were the child's natural parents.
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rehabilitative rather than punitive treatment was to be prescribed by a
team of professional specialists; probationary placement in the child's
home, with a foster family, or in an apprenticeship was preferred to in-
stitutionalization; and special "schools" were created for adjudged juve-
nile delinquents needing secure detention and supervised
rehabilitation. 17
The juvenile court movement was one of many Progressive Era re-
forms seeking a "search for order" that would replace urban society's
inharmonious elements with organized legal, professional, and govern-
mental reforms. 18 Targets of societal reorganization included misbe-
having youths who would be treated by the new juvenile court system.
Such rehabilitative efforts, however, occurred after youths came to the
courts' attention, thus assuring that society preferred reactive rather
than proactive responses to unacceptable juvenile behavior.
B. 1909 TO 1932
The Progressive Era's child savers had two primary goals. The first
was protective, designed to stimulate housing, public health, education,
and child labor reforms for lower class youth from poverty-stricken sur-
roundings.19 The second goal was structural, aimed at encouraging fed-
eral involvement in youth issues by establishing a national Children's
Bureau. 20 Both objectives were discussed at the first federally-initiated
forum on children's issues, the White House Conference on Children
and Youth, held in 1909. During the conference, President Theodore
Roosevelt outlined both the right and the need for federal involvement
in all youth issues: "The national government not only has the unques-
tioned right of research in such vital matters, but is the only agency
which can effectively conduct such general inquiries as are needed for
the benefit of our citizens. . . . In the absence of such information,
many abuses have gone unchecked."
'21
In 1912, the newly created United States Children's Bureau gave
the federal government new child serving and juvenile justice
jurisdictions:
[T]o investigate and report ... upon all matters pertaining to the welfare
of children and child life among all classes of our people, and . ..espe-
cially. . . the questions of infant mortality, the birth rate, orphanage, ju-
17 For a brief discussion of the juvenile courts' "procedural scheme," see W. V. STAPLE-
TON & L. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN
AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 15-21 (1972).
18 R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920 xiii-xiv (1967).
19 WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, PROCEEDINGS 6-7 (1909).
20 Stretch, The Rights of Children Emerge: Historical Notes on the First White House Conference on
Children, in CHILD WELFARE 365-372 (1970).
21 WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, su/,ra note 19, at 6-7.
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venile court, desertion, dangerous occupations, accidents and diseases of
children, employment, legislation affecting children in the several states
and territories .... 22
Throughout its first two decades, the Bureau launched many juve-
nile delinquency-related research endeavors: supporting studies of juve-
nile court law (1914); authoring a report on juvenile delinquents in
selected countries at war, including the United States (1918); dissemi-
nating a questionnaire measuring the extent of the American juvenile
court movement (1918); surveying the organization and method of ten
juvenile courts (1921); co-sponsoring a Standards for Juvenile Courts
conference with the National Probation Association (1923); preparing a
uniform recording and reporting plan for juvenile courts (1927); writing
a summary of juvenile delinquency causes, treatment, and prevention
for the federal government's first crime investigation commission (1930);
and successfully lobbying for and ultimately administering the first fed-
eral law providing human service grants-in-aid to states-the Shepard-
Towner Maternity Hygiene Act.
23
The intitial years of federal interest in youth issues signaled a new
willingness to assume juvenile justice research, discussion, and data col-
lecting responsibilities. The federal government, however, would not be-
come directly involved until the legislature reacted to the societal
turmoil of the Great Depression.
c. 1933 TO 1960
New Deal legislators first cast the federal government directly into
youths' lives when they created three programs to provide emergency
aid to youths affected by the Depression. The Civilian Conservation
Corps, created in 1933, developed a reforestation program for jobless
males eighteen to twenty-five years-of-age, and enlisted over two and
one-half million young men in its camps.2 4 Founded two years later in
1935, the National Youth Administration employed over 600,000 col-
lege students and another one and one-half million high school pupils in
part-time jobs.2 5 Finally, the Social Security Act provided federal
grants-in-aid to states for the care of dependent mothers and children,
the crippled, the blind, and youths in danger of becoming delinquent.
2 6
22 J. TOBEY, THE CHILDREN'S BUREAU: ITS HISTORY, AcTIvITIES AND ORGANIZATIONS
2 (1925).
23 Sheppard-Towner Maternity Hygiene Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 224. For further informa-
tion on the United States Children's Bureau, see Eliot, Six Decades of Actions for Children, 1
CHILDREN TODAY 2-6 (1972).
24 W. E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 174 (1963); see
also K. HOLLAND & F. HILL, YOUTH IN THE CCC (1942).




The 1930's, then, signaled the federal government's desire to articu-
late policies affecting both delinquents and needy youth; these were
emergency measures, however, designed to aid Depression victims. In-
deed, the transient nature of federal activism was illustrated by rapidly
contracting youth services during and after World War II. In the
1940's, the federal government sponsored only three major youth-serv-
ing efforts: the Fourth White House Conference on Children and Youth
(1940), the National Commission on Children and Youth (1942), and
the National Conference on Prevention and Control of Juvenile Delin-
quency (1946). The decade's most serious federal effort was the creation
of the first Interdepartmental Committee on Children and Youth, estab-
lished in 1948 to coordinate activities sponsored, organized, and funded
by several federal departments.
The following decade witnessed growing federal interest in juvenile
justice problems. The Federal Youth Corrections Act of 195027 pro-
vided training and rehabilitation methods for youths violating federal
laws. The Children's Bureau sponsored several new efforts: organizing
and conducting a two-year conference series to sensitize youth-serving
personnel to the need for delinquency prevention programs (1952); and
creating a new division, the Juvenile Delinquency Service, to provide
technical assistance and prepare standards and guides for state and lo-
cal, public and private agencies, as well as to recommend necessary fed-
eral and state delinquency-related legislation (1954).28 The new Senate
Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, which conducted
hearings between 1953 and 1958, recommended a comprehensive fed-
eral, state and local assistance program to strengthen and improve delin-
quency programs and services.
2 9
In summary, from the New Deal forward the federal government
expressed incremental interest in youth problems. Congressional leaders
adopted emergency plans to help impoverished, idle, and unemployed
youths, while the White House encouraged and co-sponsored national
forums to discuss youth's needs. The Children's Bureau escalated its
research and investigative juvenile justice functions, and the first Con-
gressional committee to study the national juvenile delinquency prob-
lem suggested it was time to launch a national juvenile justice program.
By 1960, juvenile delinquency statistics indicated that incremental
commitment was not enough. As the FBI's 1960 Uniform Crime Reports
statistics revealed, arrests of persons under eighteen years-of-age had
27 Federal Youth Corrections Act of 1950, 18 U.S.C § 5005 (1976).
28 Eliot, supra note 23, at 5.
2 9 Juvenile Delinquency: Hearings on S 728 and S 89f Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile
Delinquenc in the United States of the Senate Comm. on the judidaq, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1028-31,
10,110-12 (1955).
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more than doubled since 1950 even though the youth population, ages
ten through seventeen, increased by less than one-half.30 Even more
alarming were the increased arrest statistics for serious crime committed
by juveniles in 1959 and 1960: a 2.6% increase in murder and non-negli-
gent manslaughter; a 45.5% increase in manslaughter by negligence; a
24.6% increase in robbery; and an 11.6% increase in aggravated as-
sault. 3' As youth crime spread to both urban and rural neighborhoods,
public fear increased concurrently with a new federal commitment to
juvenile delinquency programs and issues.
D. 1961 TO 1980
The federal government's development of a plan for large-scale fed-
eral juvenile justice intervention was a reaction to local failure to con-
tain the frequency and severity of delinquent conduct. Considering its
inherited legacy, the federal response was predictably reactive: child
serving reformers-philanthropists as well as public policymakers-gen-
erally responded to delinquency problems after they arose. Thus, fed-
eral involvement was prompted by failures of earlier reformers
performing in a reactive rather than a proactive mode.
In 1960, the "Report to the Congress on Juvenile Delinquency," co-
authored by the Children's Bureau and the National Institute of Mental
Health, condemned the absence of a comprehensive national youth pol-
icy.32 This critical report paved the way for the Juvenile Delinquency
and Youth Offenses Act of 1961. 3 3 This Act, the first national law
aimed at controlling and preventing delinquency, set the framework for
future federal juvenile justice policy. By empowering the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare's (HEW) Secretary to provide direct
categorical grants to communities, institutions, and agencies to plan and
initiate innovative demonstration and training programs, 34 the Act as-
sured a precedent-setting flow of federal dollars to states and localities.
The Act was more than a state insurance policy; it indicated the federal
government's willingness to assume a major role in defining policies and
funding programs affecting the nation's troubled youth.
Within a short period of time, other federal acts provided new ave-
nues for youth-serving grants. In 1963, the Vocational Education Act
authorized HEW to administer and fund vocational instructional pro-
30 J. HOOVER, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS--1960 1
(1961).
3' Id. at 96.
32 UNITED STATES CHILDREN'S BUREAU AND THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL
HEALTH, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1960).
33 Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Offenses Act of 1961, 42 U.S.C. § 2541 (1976).
34 Id. at § 25413(a)-(e).
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grams as well as Head Start's pre-school program for culturally-de-
prived children.35 The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 196436
drew the Department of Labor into the youth-serving arena through its
Job Corps project, which provided high school dropouts with marketa-
ble skills.3 7 The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 as-
signed the Department of Labor a similar objective: training jobless
teenagers for eventual employment.38 Two years later, the Department
of Education developed a grants-in-aid program to remedy differential
opportunity imbalances in schools by providing supplemental monies
for compensatory education.
39
While Congress was creating new youth-serving legislation, Presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson simultaneously expanded the federal concern by
appointing the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Ad-
ministration of Justice in 1965. The commission was mandated to ex-
amine the juvenile justice system and make recommendations for future
federal efforts.40 A companion document to the Commission's 1967 gen-
eral report suggested a blueprint for such involvement: active support of
diversion and prevention projects to reduce unemployment; improved
standards of living; new community-based residential facilities and
youth service bureaus; increased educational opportunities; heightened
quality of public education; and reform of the juvenile justice system.
4
1
The Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 196842
was designed to meet Commission recommendations. By broadening
HEW's powers, the Act initially authorized a three year, $150 million
grants-in-aid program to strengthen state and local juvenile justice and
delinquency prevention programs, and to coordinate all federal youth
development activities.4 3 Like its 1961 predecessor, the Act was not spe-
cifically focused. Its objectives were delinquency prevention and con-
trol, but no substantive distinction between the two approaches was
made. Moreover, the Act did not differentiate between treatment needs
of certain types of youth. Additionally, rather than creating new youth
programs, many federal funds helped states organize their juvenile jus-
tice planning bureaucracies. 44
35 Vocational Education Act of 1973, 20 U.S.C. § 1241 (1976).
36 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-210.
37 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 20 U.S.C. 2301
(1976) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (Supp. V 1982)).
38 Manpower Development and Training Act" of 1962, 42 U.S.C. § 2571 (1976).
39 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 821 (1976).
40 Exec. Order No. 11,236, 30 Fed. Reg. 9349 (1965).
41 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 47-56 (1967).
42 Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3801 (1976).
43 Id.
44 Congress originally authorized $25 million for the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention
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Overshadowing the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control
Act was the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196845 and
its creation of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(LEAA) .46 LEAA's primary emphasis was augmenting law enforcement
for a more effective battle against increasing crime.4 7 During LEAA's
early years, federal officials ignored juvenile justice responsibilities be-
cause the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act excluded delin-
quency from LEAA's crime reduction charge. The next decade's intense
lobbying for greater federal commitment to delinquency prevention
forced LEAA to appropriate some federal monies to this end.
48
By the end of the 1960's, the federal government had adopted new
responsibilities for delinquent and needy youth. Although grants-in-aid
programs for family services, health, education, employment, recreation,
and juvenile justice existed, the belief of many Great Society legislators
that federal assistance would provide solutions encouraged hasty policy
development and some uncoordinated responses. Consequently, at least
four major federal departments were independently administering pro-
grams: the Departments of Labor, Agriculture, Justice, and HEW.
49
As the 1970's unfolded, unprecedented sums of money were allo-
cated to even more federal departments, commissions, and institutes
that, in turn, funneled funds downward to states and localities. The
1970 Youth Conservation Corps Act gave the Departments of Agricul-
ture and Interior joint responsibility for summer employment programs
for youths between fifteen and eighteen years-of-age.50 The Compre-
hensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 authorized the Depart-
and Control Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3801 (1976). The final appropriation, however, was
only $5 million, most of which was expended on state juvenile planning agencies. See Bayh,
TowardJuvenile Justice, 40 AM. SCHOLAR 662 (1970); Omart, The Juvenile Delinqueny Act-The
Scrawny Gladiator, 22 CALIF. YOUTH AUTH. Q. 4 (1969).
45 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 5 U.S.C. § 5315 (1976).
46 5 U.S.C. § 5315 (1976).
47 See id. Very little has been written about the evolution, goals, and accomplishments of
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The following provide some insight: S.
CAREY, 4 LAW AND DISORDER (1973); FEELEY & SARAT, THE POLICY DILEMMA: FEDERAL
CRIME POLICY AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, 1968-1978
(1980); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE FEDERAL ROLE (1976);
Harris, Annals of Legislation: The Turning Point, 44 NEW YORKER 68 (Dec. 14, 1968).
48 For statements explicating such lobbying efforts between 1971 and 1977, see Implementa-
tion of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. Hearings Before the Subcomm. to
Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. oftheJudiciaty, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 152-53,
253-57 (1977) (testimony of Robert Dye, Chairman, National Interagency Program Collabo-
ration on Juvenile Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
49 For a complete discussion of these departments' roles, see C. SIMMONS, M. KANNEN-
SOHN, J. FOSTER, A. JOHNSON, W. MURPHY & J. WHITE, MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUS-
TICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING: GRANTS IN AID OF LOCAL DELINQUENCY PREVENTION
AND CONTROL SERVICES 131-177 (1981).
50 Youth Conservation Corps Act of 1970, 16 U.S.C. § 1702 (1976).
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ment of Labor to allocate funds to local governments for the creation of
public jobs for disadvantaged and unemployed youths and adults. 5'
Despite diverse federal involvement, by 1970 the 1968 Delinquency
Prevention and Control Act gave HEW primary legislative authority
over federal interests in pre-delinquent and delinquent youth. Amend-
ments to the 1961 Crime Control and Juvenile Delinquency Prevention
Acts, however, began to blur distinctions between the role of HEW and
the Department of Justice. The Crime Control amendments of 1970
required LEAA to include prevention, control and juvenile delinquency
reduction programs.5 2 A 1971 amendment to the Juvenile Delinquency
Prevention and Control Act assigned new boundaries for HEW and
LEAA: HEW would concentrate on delinquency prevention and reha-
bilitation programs administered outside the traditional criminal justice
system (i.e., health, welfare, and runaway issues), while LEAA ;vould
develop programs within the system (i.e., police, courts, and correctional
institutions).53 The 1973 Crime Control Act amendments expanded
LEAA's delinquency jurisdiction by requiring each state to submit a
"comprehensive program . . . for the improvement of juvenile justice"
in its criminal justice plan.
54
In 1974, the overlapping jurisdictions shared by HEW and the De-
partment of Justice were finally cleared up. The Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (JJDP Act)55 designated a new of-
fice as the official federal agency for the financing and administering of
juvenile delinquency assistance, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention (OJJDP).
56
Passage of the JJDP Act was a landmark federal action for several
reasons. First, the responsibility for youth issues, traditionally delegated
to HEW, the nation's largest social welfare agency, shifted to the De-
partment of Justice, the nation's foremost law enforcement agency. Sec-
ond, OJJDP's focus was clearly preventive:
(1) [t]o develop and implement effective methods of preventing and reduc-
ing juvenile delinquency; (2) to develop and conduct effective programs to
prevent delinquency, to divert juveniles from the traditional juvenile jus-
tice system and to provide critically needed alternatives to institutionaliza-
tion; (3) to improve the quality ofjuvenile justice in the United States; and
51 Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 801 (1976).
52 Crime Control Amendments, Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-644, 84 Stat. 1880 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 3701 (Supp. V 1982)).
53 Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act Amendments of 1971, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3801 (1976).
54 Crime Control Act of 1973, 5 U.S.C. § 5108 (1976).
55 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1976).
56 Id. at Title II, Parts A-D (creation of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention and explication of its duties).
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(4) to increase the capacity of state and local governments and public and
private agencies to conduct effective juvenile justice and delinquency pre-
vention and rehabilitation programs and to provide research, evaluation
and training services in the field of juvenile delinquency prevention.
5 7
Finally, the JJDP Act assigned coordination of all federal juvenile
delinquency programs to its other new creation, the Coordinating Coun-
cil on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 58 The independent
Council's role required an annual report to the President and Attorney
General about federal policy priorities, including recommendations for
future federal actions.
59
Thus, not until 1974 did the federal government commit financial,
research, and technical assistance to delinquency prevention theories
and programs. The JJDP Act's predecessors, the Juvenile Delinquency
and Youth Offenses Act of 196160 and the Juvenile Delinquency Preven-
tion and Control Act of 1968,61 had invested between $60 and $80 mil-
lion on juvenile delinquency program efforts between 1951 and 1974.62
In comparison, OJJDP received generous appropriations for its first six
years: $25 million in 1975, $40 million in 1976, $75 million in 1977, and
$100 million annually from 1978 to 1980.63 Clearly, the federal govern-
ment had made a commitment to juvenile justice reform and delin-
quency prevention.
This historical analysis highlights gradual federal involvement in
juvenile justice issues: no federal role from colonial times to the twenti-
57 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1976).
58 42 U.S.C. §§ 5616-5619 (1976).
59 Other provisions of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 in-
cluded a $350 million three-year authorization of funds; mechanisms for both block and cate-
gorical grants; origins of a National Runaway Program to be jointly funded by the Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and HEW, and operated by HEW; continued
direction of LEAA's 19.15% "maintenance of effort" funds to juvenile programs per the 1973
Crime Control Act Amendments; the creation of the National Advisory Committee for Juve-
nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention made up of major federal agency directors; and the
establishment of a National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention to act
as both an information clearinghouse and a training and research branch. 42 U.S.C. § 5601.
60 42 U.S.C. § 2541 (1976).
61 42 U.S.C. § 3801 (1976).
62 Between 1961 and 1967, Congress authorized a total of $47 million to the Juvenile
Delinquency and Youth Offenses Act of 1961, 42 U.S.C. § 2541 (1976). In 1968, the Juvenile
Delinquency Prevention and Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3801 (1976), received a $5 million final
appropriation in its initial years, and between $5 and $10 million each year until its termina-
tion in 1974. See Bayh, supra note 44, at 662-66; Ohmart, supra note 44, at 18-23.
63 Increased appropriations for the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of
1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1976), were never easily attained. The Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention's early financial insecurity is illuminated in STAFF OF HOUsE COM-
MITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S FIGHT
AGAINST YOUTH CRIME: A REVIEW OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELIN-




eth century's first decade; incremental federal interest via conferences,
research, data collection and dissemination, and short-term emergency
family and youth-serving legislation from 1909 to 1960; minor federal
commitment to new delinquency causal and treatment theories from
1961 to 1974; and a large scale federal obligation of resources to innova-
tive delinquency prevention programs from 1974 to the early 1980's.
This unprecedented influx of delinquency prevention assistance stimu-
lated a new era of creative programs designed for pre-delinquent and
delinquent youth. Several results of these programs are reviewed in the
following section.
III. PREVENTION THEORIES AND PROGRAMS
Translating prevention theories into practice did not gain wide sup-
port until the 1970's. As programs emerged, most developed in response
to two major delinquency causation theories: first, delinquent behavior
is caused by the individual's problems; and second, delinquent behavior
is caused by larger societal problems.64 The following sections will ex-
amine prevention strategies emanating from these causal theories.
65
A. DELINQUENCY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
The earliest delinquency causation theories focused on the inher-
ently evil nature of children and their individual propensity to deviance,
as well on the child's familial and environmental surroundings. 66 Ac-
cordingly, treatment measures were aimed at punishing individual devi-
ance through institutionalization or at rehabilitating unacceptable
behavior through treatment-oriented institutionalization.67 As twentieth
century theories grew more sophisticated, delinquency treatment meth-
ods matured accordingly. Psychopathic, maladjusted, learning-disabled,
lower-class, and unemployed children received an at-risk label and were
targeted for special delinquency prevention programs.
The Cambridge-Somerville Youth Project, conducted between
1936 and 1946, was one of the nation's earliest prevention programs.
6 8
Teachers identified 750 boys likely to become delinquent from schools in
Cambridge and Somerville, Massachusetts. Half of the boys were
64 G. JOHNSON, T. BIRD, J. W. LITTLE, & S. BEVILLE, supra note 3, at 2-1 - 2-3.
65 Much information about the following programs was derived from the very helpful
publication by G. JOHNSON, T. BIRD, J. W. LITTLE, & S. BEVILLE, supra note 3, at 2-1 - 2-79.
66 Seegenerally P. ARIES, supra note 8; L. EMPEY, AMERICAN DELINQUENCY: ITS MEAN-
ING AND CONSTRUCTION 71-95 (1978); THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD, supra note 8.
67 See generall J. HAWvES, supra note 10; R. PICKETT, supra note 10; A. PLATT, supra note
10; D. ROTHMAN, supra note 10; E. RYERSON, supra note 10.
68 See E. POWERS & H. WITMER, AN EXPERIMENT IN THE PREVENTION OF DELIN-
QUENCY: THE CAMBRIDGE-SOMERVILLE YOUTH STUDY (1951).
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placed in an experimental group where they receieved individual coun-
seling, tutoring, family guidance, and recreational opportunities. The
other half were placed in a control group and received no such services.
Comparative studies of both groups surveyed five, ten, and twenty-five
years after treatment indicated no significant delinquency reductions
between treated and untreated youth.
69
Similar conclusions were reached by a growing number of pro-
grams treating individual problems:
* A 1976 OJJDP-commissioned study through the National Center for
State Courts reviewed court and self-reported questionnaire data on 1,692
youths to compare the prevalence of delinquent behavior among learning
disabled and non-learning disabled youth. 70 While 32% of the adjudicated
youth had learning disabilities compared with only 16% of the nonadjudi-
cated youth, the self-report studies indicated no significant differences be-
tween learning disabled and non-learning disabled either in delinquent
behavior or in police contacts. 71
0 A 1978 study reviewed 170 youth-serving projects in which seventy-
eight projects focused on individual characteristics through casework, psy-
chotherapy, counseling, education, behavior modification, and wilderness
program approaches. The overwhelming majority found no delinquency
reduction among recipients of individualized preventive treatment.
72
* A 1978 review of twelve vocational and work programs conducted be-
tween 1966 and 1974 found that the only three programs reducing delin-
quent conduct gave youths long-term career and educational advancement
opportunities.
73
* A 1979 study of the "Scared Straight" encounter between violent of-
fenders at New Jersey's Rahway prison and teenagers found that within six
months after the sessions, 41% of those treated committed serious crimes,
compared with only 11% of the control group.
7 4
69 See generally Berleman & Steinburn, The Value and Validiy of Delinqueny Prevention Experi-
ments, 15 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 474 (1969); McCord, A Thir-Year Follow-Up of Treatment
Efects, 1 CRIM. REV. YEARBOOK 688 (1979); Toby, An Evaluation of Early Identfication and
Intensive Treatment Programsfor Predelinquents, in PREVENTION OF DELINQUENCY: PROBLEMS
AND PROGRAMS (Stratton & Terry eds. 1968).
70 For a detailed discussion of learning disability theories and programs prior to 1976, see
I. KEILITZ, M. SAKS & P. BRODER, THE EVALUATION OF LEARNING DISABILITIES: JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY REMEDIATION PROGRAM EVALUATION DESIGN AND INTERIM RESULTS
(1979); C. MURRAY, THE LINK BETWEEN LEARNING DISABILITIES AND JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY: CURRENT THEORY AND KNOWLEDGE (1976); J. ZIMMERMAN, W. RICH, I. KEILITZ
& P. BRODER, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE LINK BETWEEN LEARNING DISABILITIES AND
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1980).
71 G. JOHNSON, T. BIRD, J. W. LITTLE & S. BEVILLE, supra note 3, at 2-13.
72 D. ROMIG, JUSTICE FOR OUR CHILDREN: AN EXAMINATION OF JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENT REHABILITATION PROGRAMS (1978).
73 Id. at 43-56.
74 7 Juv. JUST. DIG. 3, 4 (May 4, 1979). It should be noted that in another Scared
Straight study, released in 1980, a 22-month follow-up revealed higher incidence of delin-
quent behavior among the control group than the treatment group. The 1980 study, how-
ever, was conducted with youths having one or more prior offenses, while the 1979 study
included only youth with no offense records. See S. LANGER, FEAR IN THE DETERRENCE OF
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* A 1980 study of a large-scale employment program conducted between
1975 and 1977 reported that work support had little impact in decreasing
the target group's delinquent activities, largely because youth felt the pro-
gram could not prepare them for entry level jobs or careers.
75
Clearly, many preventive approaches addressing individual person-
ality, environmental, economic, and learning problems showed little
success. A 1981 report commissioned by OJJDP concluded that "many
characteristics addressed by such programs appear to be unrelated to
delinquent behavior; more importantly, the roots of the problem do not
reside in individuals at all." 76 These findings suggest delinquency causa-
tions are related to environmental settings--especially schools, neigh-
borhoods, and families-rather than to individual deviance.
Accordingly, many prevention theories and programs have begun to ad-
dress larger social problems.
B. DELINQUENCY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
Contemporary theorists most often find delinquency causations
deeply embedded in our social structure's policies and practices. Those
theories gaining widest recognition in sociological and criminological
circles fall into four categories: subcultural and differential association,
strain and opportunity, bonding, and labeling:
* Subcultural theorists identify delinquency causes in the diversity of
norms characterizing different groups or population segments, while differ-
ential association theorists believe delinquency results when illegally
learned behavior is reinforced rather than scorned.
77
* Strain and opportunity theorists blame delinquency on a misaligned
social structure that causes gaps between desirable and achievable goals,
encouraging some persons to seek opportunities through illegitimate
channels.
78
* Bonding theorists maintain that weakened or nonexistent conventional
ties to familial, educational, religious, or economic social structures causes
nonconforming, delinquent behavior.
79
* Labeling theorists believe that assigning youth negative labels encour-
DELINQUENCY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RAHWAY STATE PRISON LIFER'S PROGRAM,
A BRIEF SYNOPSIS (1980).
75 MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORP., SUMMARY AND FINDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL SUPPORTED WORK DEMONSTRATION 9 (1980).
76 G. JOHNSON, T. BIRD, J. W. LITTLE & S. BEVILLE, supra note 3, at 2-23.
77 Subculture theories are discussed in A. COHEN, DELINQUENT Boys: THE CULTURE OF
THE GANG (1955); Miller, Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquengy, J. SOC.
ISSUES (1958).
78 Robert Merton initially formulated strain theory. See Merton, Social Structure and Ano-
ine, Am. Soc. REv. (October, 1937). Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd C. Ohlin applied this
theory to explain lower class delinquency. R. CLOWARD & L. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND
OPPORTUNITY: A THEORY OF DELINQUENT GANGS (1960).
79 Travis Hirschi initially formulated bonding theory. T. HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELIN-
QUENCY (1969).
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ages conformation to expectations associated with the label.80
Initial prevention programs based upon these social structure theo-
ries demonstrated disappointing or inclusive results primarily for two
reasons. First, throughout the 1970's, most practitioners used individual
treatment, thereby converting "macrotheory into microtherapy."8 1 In
essence, they believed that traditional individualized treatment could
prevent delinquent behavior caused by institutional policies and proce-
dures adversely affecting youth. A recent study of thirty-six juvenile de-
linquency prevention programs operating in 1979 indicates the
popularity of this approach: each of the twenty-two (66%) programs
describing a primary prevention8 2 objective relied upon individual
counseling and/or therapy in school, work, family, community and/or
peer group settings.
83
Second, delinquency prevention effectiveness could not be mea-
sured in nineteen of the twenty-two programs: sixteen were not evalu-
ated in this area and three had inconclusive data. Only three programs
underwent evaluations capable of determining some degree of effective-
ness: the Community Crime Prevention Program, Marion County
Mental Health Prevention Project, and Open Road.
* The Community Crime Prevention Program (CCPP) in Seattle, Wash-
ington, targets neighborhoods most vulnerable to burglary, educates inter-
ested neighbors in crime prevention, and helps organize citizen cooperative
activities.84 Surveys conducted in 1974 and 1975 with CCPP participants
and non-participants indicated lower burglary rates for those involved in
CCPP. The CCPP model, however, "makes crime more difficult to com-
mit, but does not address the motivation to commit crime, in youths or
adults."'85 The pr6ject focuses on deterrence strategies adopted by individ-
uals and groups of youths and adults, but does not confront societal
problems encouraging delinquent conduct.
80 Labeling theory was first discussed in F. TANNENBAUM, CRIME AND THE COMMUNITY
(1938). It was not until the 1960's, however, that the theory gained much credibility. See D.
CRESSEY, DELINQUENCY, CRIME AND SOCIAL PROCESS 585-89 (1969); see also H. BECKER,
THE OUTSIDERS (1963); E. LEMERT, HUMAN DEVIANCE, SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL
CONTROL (1967).
81 G. JOHNSON, T. BIRD, J. W. LITrLE & S. BEVILLE, supra note 3, at 2-4.
82 Practitioners and theorists often refer to three kinds of target populations for preven-
tion services: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary prevention programs deliver services
to all youth regardless of their potential for delinquency; secondary prevention programs
work with youth who are in greater danger of becoming delinquent; tertiary prevention activ-
ities work with youth who have already been referred for assistance through law enforcement,
school authorities, or other official channels. Because this study focuses on proactive preven-
tion, both primary and secondary target populations would be included.
83 J. WALL, J. D. HAWKINS, D. LISHER & M. FRASER, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PREVEN-
TION, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION: A COMPENDIUM OF
36 PROGRAM MODELS (Law Enf't Assistance Admin. (1981)).




* Marion County's Mental Health Prevention Project in Salem, Oregon,
created a Primary Prevention Task Force to identify, encourage, and pro-
mote primary prevention activities in communities throughout the
county.86 An evaluation conducted in 1976 stated that "there was no pro-
gram effect on alcohol and drug abuse as measured by community-wide
social indicators, police and juvenile statistics on alcohol and drug related
arrests, and referrals to various agencies."
'8 7
* Open Road in San Francisco, California, allows students to participate
actively in school administration through individual and group educa-
tional programs. 88 One evaluation found the Open Road technique
"promising," but regretted that the lack of consistent school reporting dis-
allowed data measurements comparing all schools and assessing the project
as a whole.8 9
Rather than criticize the lack of uniform evaluation measures and
indicators of programmatic effectiveness, the authors of the study con-
cluded that the programs represented "a range of promising ap-
proaches," and recommended that "[c]ontinual experimental work is
essential to develop an effective technology for delinquency
prevention." 9
Another recent study adopted a similar positive stance, calling for a
series of innovative prevention programs designed to reform institu-
tional policies and procedures negatively affecting youth.91 It advocated
changing educational practices encouraging and reinforcing delinquent
tendencies; removing societal hurdles discouraging equal educational
and career opportunities; improving those settings which undermine in-
centives for conventional behavior; and reforming organizational poli-
cies producing negative labels that result in misconduct.
92
Such strategies favor the treatment of institutional maladies rather
than individual deviancy. Supporting these new proactive prevention
theories and programs are a small but growing number of studies
indicating:
* negative self perceptions were more a function of school isolation (low
grades, poor athletic and social participation, lack of involvement) than
judicial processing in an examination of 1,227 Oregon youth, 303 of whom
had delinquency records;
93
0 learning disabled juveniles involved in delinquent behavior are more
often adjudicated than their peers, not necessarily because of their disabili-
86 Id. at 73.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 82-83.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 3.
91 G. JOHNSON, T. BIRD, J. W. LITrLE & S. BEVILLE, supra note 3, at 2-44 - 2-49, 2-62 - 2-
74.
92 Id.
93 &ey generaly M. CHASTAIN, DELINQUENCY, THE SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, & CONCEP-
TIONS OF SELF & OPPORTUNITIES (1977).
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ties, but because they are often less capable of communicating with au-
thorities, have poor scholastic records, and are differentially treated in the
juvenile justice system;
94
* students will tend to justify rebellion if the school structure and policies
are unjust, if educational rewards and incentives are unequal, and if the
decision-making process discourages involvement in and responsibility for
the school;
95
* limited access, or the perception thereof, to legitimate occupational op-
portunities encourages poor scholastic achievement and delinquency;
96
* family prevention programs improving communication skills and
building responsibility negotiation and contingency contracting skills are
more successful than individual counseling efforts;
9 7
* conventional behavior may be maintained through four control
processes-commitment, attachment, involvement, and belief-relating-to
some important positive affiliations with family, employment, school, reli-
gion, or peer group organization. 98
These new studies substantiate both the unsuccessful nature of individ-
ual treatment as well as the potential for proactive prevention programs
designed to modify family, school, and peer group policies and interac-
tional strategies. Thus, we currently have an idea about which preven-
tion strategies do not work and we also have enough experimental data
to indicate those approaches that may work if renewed resources are de-
voted to further prevention phases.
Before discussing the federal government's role in a future delin-
quency prevention stage, it is important to review its past and present
role. The most recent analysis of the federal delinquency prevention
effort-authored by OJJDP, the Coordinating Council on Juvenile Jus-
94 See generally J. ZIMMERMAN, W. RICH, I. KEILITZ & P. BRODER, supra note 70; STATE
OF CALIF. COMM'N ON CRIME CONTROL & VIOLENCE PREVENTION, AN OUNCE OF PREVEN-
TION: TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE CAUSES OF VIOLENCE 34 (1981).
95 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, ED. & WELFARE, 1 VIOLENT SCHOOLS-SAFE
SCHOOLS: THE SAFE SCHOOL STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS (1978); Coleman, Deviant Sub-
cultures and the Schools, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL CRIME AND POVERTY (R.
Rubel ed. 1979); Gottfredson, Disruption in 600 Schools--the Social Ecology of Personal Victimization
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tice and Delinquency Prevention, and the National Advisory Commit-
tee on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention-examined forty-
five separate programs operating in 1980 within seven cabinet-level de-
partments and two independent agencies providing financial assistance
to state and local youth program operations. 99 Of the forty-five pro-
grams, nine (20%) explicitly mandate delinquency reduction or preven-
tion in their authorizing legislation while five others refer to juvenile
delinquency in some official document.I°0 Just over one-third designate
a delinquency prevention or reduction goal. The survey did not, how-
ever, define delinquency nor did it request a resource estimate for alloca-
tions to that goal. Therefore, it may be concluded that the percentage
of time and money expended on proactive prevention is not only un-
known, but is substantially lower than other federal delinquency pre-
vention and reduction programs.
The study also surveyed the types of direct services, finding that the
largest federal expenditures (82%) were for individual and family
mental health and counseling services, followed in popularity by 79% for
educational services, 75% for life-skill services, 74% for employment serv-
ices, and 68% for family support. 01 When compared with the above-
cited recent studies indicating the ineffectiveness of individual counsel-
ing and therapy as opposed to potential effectiveness of school and fam-
ily interaction programs, it is clear that federal resources have been
applied to unsuccessful prevention strategies. This fact, however, does
not suggest federal support was wasted; instead, it indicates a federal
contribution to a body of theoretical knowledge about what does and
does not prevent juvenile crime.
V. CONCLUSION
If one accepts the above interpretation of past federal efforts, it fol-
lows that the federal government's next step should be participation in
the transfer of such theories into practice. This would represent a logi-
cal, evolutionary effort to build upon sound theoretical foundations, not
an expanded commitment to a disproven treatment method. When
considering the historical evidence, this suggestion gains further
credence. Over 125 years of coercive and protective policies evolved
under the sporadic direction of private charity as well as under the di-
99 See genera/1, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FIFTH ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF FEDERAL
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROGRAMS 7-10, 18-22 (1980). The 45 federal programs are au-
thorized under 25 separate congressional acts, over half of which were passed after 1970.
Excluded from this analysis were federal programs supporting research, planning, technical
assistance, and training activities.
100 Id. at 31.
101 Id. at 33.
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rection of state and local governments. Federal intervention, gradually
introduced during the Progressive Era, expanded to include emergency
family relief legislation during the Depression. Direct federal commit-
ment in the form of state and local grants-in-aid began in the late
1960's, gained great popularity by the decade's end, and grew to unprec-
edented proportions in the 1970's.
Ironically, at the same time a significant body of prevention exper-
tise is growing, the executive branch is proposing a period of federal
social and economic contraction. Yet, as contemporary policymakers
and citizens point accusing fingers at federal delinquency prevention
failures, they ignore almost two decades of progress. Today's practition-
ers and theorists not only know that individualized treatment probably
will not prevent delinquency, they have good reason to believe preven-
tive school, family, community, and peer group programs aimed at
modifying negative institutional policies and practices may help prevent
juvenile crime.
These promising indicators warrant careful consideration before
the federal government withdraws its support of prevention theories and
programs. This does not suggest a long-term federal obligation to pre-
ventive youth services; rather, it encourages detailed analyses of recent
studies, as well as an educated appraisal of how reduced subsidization
and a return to punitive treatment would affect youthful clients across
the nation. Nor does this analysis theorize that prevention programs
can solve the juvenile crime problem. Instead, it hopes to clarify the
historical and contemporary status of prevention theories and programs.
Ultimately, this Article recommends federal support for transfer-
ring new, proactive prevention theories into workable programs that
will modify institutional policies and procedures negatively affecting
youth. Without taking this final step, citizens and policymakers will
have no way to measure the total federal impact on the problems of
juvenile delinquency.
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